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THE CONSOLIDATED ACTION
ONE TRIAL FOR ONE CONTROVERSY
T SEEMS to be characteristic of the human mind that ten-
dencies and movements, which received their impulse in
the accidents or incidents of the moment, become enveloped,
in the course of time, in a tradition of envisioned and in-
spired purpose, and of planned and deliberate creation.
Such is the inherent vice of looking backward. In the
retrospect of the distant view, the blurring and blending of
detail is mistaken for the symmetry and perfection of pre-
conceived purpose and execution.
The contemporary critical mind is too much occupied in
the mechanics of transition to afford leisurely detachment
and the satisfaction of contemplating the admiration-which
those of tomorrow are sure to exhibit-for the supposedly
brilliant conception of today. Being an incident of the proc-
ess, no wonder that he cannot become sufficiently indifferent
to the maladjustments of today.
In the law of practice, this is particularly so. The Civil
Practice Act, as a whole, is a thing of wonder. No single
mind, building anew, could create such a masterpiece. Yet,
like the work of great painters, it is only from a distance that
the pattern is unmarred. On close inspection, its maladjust-
ments are many,-its scope and course, diverse,-its execu-
tion the result of the contributions of successive collaborators
of unequal skill, of inharmonious spirit, and of unconcerted
purpose. Compromise too often has defeated coherent execu-
tion of its many contributors.
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To appreciate that the Civil Practice Act is imperfect
and that the cases construing it have not always removed
those imperfections, is not to be unmindful of its merit.
The product of experience, like the figures of history,
need not be devoid of human frailties to command respect
and reverence.
The lawyer takes things as he finds them. It is enough
that the courts have marked the way.
The judges, because they are lawyers, abide by the same
standard, but, because they are judges, occasionally divert
or advance the stream of progress. Responsibility and cau-
tion, essential to their function, rightly prevent rash general-
ization or unnecessary change.
But correction and change are the vital, dynamic forces
of procedural progress, as in all other endeavors. To look
backward at the procedure of the ancient common law is
proof ample of that self-evident truth.
It is the function of the law teacher,-not merely to look
backward and permit himself to become a part of the chimeri-
cal retrospect, as he must, in his capacity as a lawyer; nor
merely to preserve the critical attitude of the contemporary
critic, as he does in his function of mentor,-but, also, to look
forward, and, at the risk of the later disillusionment of his
students, to point the way to the future, as he must in his
role of guide.
His is the organized view, where relationships, compari-
sons and contrasts are more important than isolated rules or
decisions.
It would seem to be an apt initial effort, in this direction,
to formulate a rationalization of the rules for joinder of par-
ties and causes of action, out of the isolated and unrelated
decisions on the subject,-in view of the fact that it emerges
from a background characterized by all that has been said,
and is, therefore, particularly incomprehensible to students,
who, for the most part, will be the readers of this article.
There can be no doubt that the future will breathe into
this robot, intellectual direction and mental control, so that
the resultant rules will be credited to intended purpose.
In entering upon this task, we have no purpose to wend
our way through the uncorrelated- judicial decisions. Little
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light will be found, in the language of the courts, for the
wayfarer who seeks formulated understanding, on this but
dimly marked path through the wilderness, which has not yet
attained the proportions of a road. Rather, shall we formu-
late a rationalization of the results of judicial decision, as if
those who created the statute preconceived and intended such
to be the result.
The Statutes Involved.
The following sections of the Civil Practice Act form
the subject of this discussion:*
A.
Plaintiff's Joinder of Parties and Causes of Action.
1. Section 209,-constituting the standard for
joinder of parties plaintiff, where each has an indepen-
dent, separately enforceable cause of action.
2. Sections 211, 212, 213,-constituting the stan-
dard for joinder of parties defendant, and contemplat-
ing liability of defendants who might be separately
and independently sued.
3. Section 258,--stipulating the conditions un-
der which causes of action may be joined.
B.
Defendant's Interposition of Counterclaims.
4. Sections 266 and 267,--authorizing the inter-
position of counterclaims.
5. Section 271,-authorizing the joinder of ad-
ditional parties, in connection with counterclaims.
C.
Adding or Dropping Parties After Action Commenced.
6. Section 192,--authorizing the adding or drop-
ping of parties.
* See Appendix for sections in full (htfra p. 171).
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7. Section 83,-permitting the continuance of
an action, notwithstanding transfer of interest or
devolution of liability, with the right to add or sub-
stitute the new party.
8. Section 193,-authorizing the joinder of par-
ties, on application of the defendant, or of a third per-
son, or by direction of the court.
9. Section 211-a,--permitting adjustment of con-
tribution between joint tort feasors.
10. Section 287,-generally known as inter-
pleader by order.
11. Sections 96, 97, 97-a, 338-a,-treating of con-
solidation of actions.
A.
Plaintiff's Joinder of Parties and Causes of Action.
The Setting of the Problem.
At common law, issues were single and parties, if they
were not necessary, were superfluous. It was equity which
sponsored the desirability of determining related issues,
in one trial, and, accordingly, developed the conception of
proper parties, as distinguished from necessary ones.
The Code of Civil Procedure (the predecessor of the
Civil Practice Act) accomplished at least the expression of
the ideal of the single civil action.1 Distinctions between ac-
tions at law and suits in equity were no longer to be honored.
Equity and law were to be administered in one court, by the
same judges who would, as occasion demanded, enforce rules
of law and principles of equity.
The result of this process was the gradual infiltration of
principles of equity into actions at law, and the equitable
rules as to joinder of parties gradually, but surely, began to
supplant legal standards. The path of procedural reform is
marked by the substitution of equitable for legal standards.
But, though the process was ever going on, it was not
recognized by many, nor concurrently supplemented by com-
pensating changes in related subjects.
'C. P. A., Sec. 8.
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Those who created the Code of Civil Procedure conceived
of causes of action, as utterly independent of the parties who
owned them or against whom they were asserted. Accord-
ingly, there were rules for joinder of causes of action, and
separate and independent rules for joinder of parties.
Furthermore, the standard for classification of causes of
action was a supposedly logical differentiation between types
of causes of action; not an inquiry into the identity of the
controversy from which these causes of action emerged. So,
for instance, if A slandered and assaulted B, at the same in-
stant of time, these constituted two separate causes of action,
which had to be separately instituted, separately prosecuted,
and separately proved, though both causes of action had their
origin in the same controversy, and no witness could testify
as to one cause of action, without inevitably involving the
other.2
The functional standard of one trial for one controversy
was, in no sense, in view.
The Present Point of View.
Today, however, with increasing litigation and more
vivid realization of the wastefulness of duplicating trials,
and hopeful, though not confident, of the increased capacity
of modern-day juries to absorb and differentiate between the
rights of diverse participants in a single controversy,-the
effort is, as far as possible, to dispose of all phases of one
controversy in one trial.
We are not concerned with logical differentiation be-
tween causes of action. We appreciate that so-called causes
of action are the results of an unrealistic rationalization un-
related to the mode of proof. We understand that it is the
substantial identity of the evidence, which will be adduced
on the trial, which constitutes the bond between legally in-
dependent causes of action, owned by or asserted against
legally unrelated litigants. We refuse to be bound by hard
and fast rules as to joinder of causes of action and of parties,
formulated inexorably in advance of the particular litigation.
2 Paul v. Ford, 117 App. Div. 151, 102 N. Y. Supp. 359 (lst Dept. 1907).
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We prefer flexible and adjustable standards of discretion,
yielding to the situation presented in the particular case.
The Merging of Inconsistent Standards.
When the Civil Practice Act was adopted, as might be
imagined, there were stout adherents of both points of view.
The resulting statute was a compromise.
Section 258 comes to us from the old Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. It preserves the old classification of causes of aetion,
according to arbitrary logical standards. Contracts might
be tried together, though unrelated in origin; 3 torts might
be tried together, though widely separated in point of time,
place and circumstance. 4 Slander and assault might not be
joined, though involving the same persons and occurring at
the same instant of time.' Causes of action must be consis-
tent; must not require different places of trial; must belong
to one of the classifications specified by the statute, except
that, though not embraced within any subdivision other than
subdivision 9, they might be joined, if, pursuant to that sec-
tion, they arose out of the "same transaction" or were "tran-
sactions connected with the same subject of action."
This section retained the conception of causes of action
as logical theories of recovery, divorced from the parties who
owned them or against whom they were asserted.
Sections 209, 211, 212 and 213 were new statutes, with-
out prototypes in the Code of Civil Procedure. They were
modelled upon the English and New Jersey statutes, which
recognized no distinction between causes of actions and of
parties. The procedural laws of neither of these jurisdictions
made separate provision for parties as distinguished from
causes of action.
Under these sections, the standard for joinder of parties,
who might otherwise sue or be sued independently of each
other, was only that there must be a common question of fact
or law. It was the same controversy which was to be investi-
gated. How many so-called causes of action might emerge
from this controversy, and what might be their character,
' Subdivision 1.
'Subdivisions 2, 3.
" Cf. Subdivisions 2 and 3.
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was immaterial,-if only, from the functional point of view
of what evidence would be adduced on the trial, there was
substantial identity of the subject of controversy.
Obviously, upon such a standard, consistency of causes
of action was immaterial. Logical consistency was inconse-
quential, as long as there was functional consistency in the
subject of investigation.
Yet, Section 258 required that causes of action must
be logically consistent, and Section 209 (and Section 211,
by implication) expressly provided that independent plain-
tiffs might recover and independent defendants might
be liable in the "alternative," which, of course, embraced
"inconsistency." 6
To make confusion worse confounded, Section 213-per-
mitting joinder of defendants, where plaintiff was in doubt-
clearly contemplated inconsistent or alternative claims of
liability in whole or in part.
The Problem Imposed Upon the Courts.
Such was the legislative cross-word puzzle submitted to
the judiciary for solution-inconsistent standards placed in
juxtaposition; the standards themselves beclouded in the am-
biguities and uncertainties of past judicial interpretations-
a solution required as an incident of the judicial process
where the legislative function had proved incapable and
unavailing.
It is obvious, of course, that a progressive and advanced
attitude, on the part of the courts (and such there was), was
hardly adequate to cut the Gordian Knot. There was the
statute, with its anachronistic remnants of a system un-
adjusted to present standards, which could not be ignored.
To steer a proper course, between the shoals of anti-
quated doctrine, in the functional approach to the newer con-
ceptions of litigation, required nice distinctions between the
judicial function and the legislative prerogative, as reflected
in the statute.
No wonder, therefore, that progress was and is halting,
the formulation of doctrine obscure, and the goal rather
sensed than seen.
*Cf. Webster's New International Dictionary defining "alternative."
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Rationalization of the rules to be applied, in advance of
precise situations calling for decision, is not to be expected,
nor is it to be found, in judicial decisions promulgated under
such circumstances. The process of adjustment is the ardu-
ous task of the present; the rights of litigants still to come
impose restrictions on hasty judicial generalization of pro-
cedural problems. Lights and shadows flicker across the ter-
rain, but no steady beam points the way.
Judicial Landmarks.
Two appellate decisions, containing rather comprehen-
sive discussions of the subject of this article, loom up for
consideration. They are Sherlock v. Manwaren, 7 and Ader
v. Blau.8
The Sherlock case, in the effort to give full effect to the
spirit of the newer tendency, as reflected in Sections 209 and
211, 212 and 213, as to parties, ignores the restrictions of
Section 258, as to causes of action.
The Ader case, though appreciative of the desirability of
facilitating one trial for one controversy, yet in obedience to
the statute gives effect to the restrictions imposed by the
older limitations on joinder of causes of action.
Though much is said in the Sherlock case,-which, in
view of the later and more authoritative decision of the Court
of Appeals in Ader v. Blau, is not law,-yet the actual de-
cision is well within the limits of the statute itself.
The Sherlock case involved joinder of causes of action,
all of one class (Subdivision 2, of Section 258) and required,
therefore, no application of Subdivision 9, of Section 258.
But, the significant thing about the Sherlock case, is that
the problem of joinder of parties and causes of action is con-
sidered as addressed to the discretion of the Court, whereas
the Court of Appeals in the Ader case decided the issues
there presented as those of law.
Thus where the old standard of logical classification of
causes of action comes in conflict with the new standard of
functional identity of subject matter, it is the supposed logic
208 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. 709 (4th Dept. 1924).
p241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771 (1925).
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of consistency, rather than the homogeneity of the evidence
involved, which is the guiding principle.
The clash of fundamental theories is strikingly illus-
trated in the Ader case. The majority of the court, following
the mandate of Section 258, find that Section 209 "has only a
remote bearing" sa and, applying the logical theory of litiga-
tion, concludes that there is not one "subject of action" be-
cause there are "different negligent acts alleged in the two
causes of action and that, therefore, 'who is liable for the
death of plaintiff's intestate' is not * * * a common ques-
tion. * * * "8 b Judge Cardozo, who dissented, did so notwith-
standing the mandate of Section 258, because he subscribed
to the functional view of litigation: "* * * a death so oc-
sioned supplies a unifying center which 'connects' the sub-
ject of action in one court with the subject of action in
the other." S
Nevertheless, the decision of the majority was inevitable,
if Section 258 were to be given any meaning.
Formulation of Rules.
The limits of this article forbid more minute considera-
tion of the foregoing authorities and of the other decisions
based upon them. The process of reaching the conclusions
herein stated would, of course, be important in a complete
exposition of the subject. But, keeping within the limit
which we have set ourselves, we venture the following formu-
lation of rules:
1. The Civil Practice Act maintains the distinc-
tion between joinder of causes of action, and joinder
of parties who own, or against whom are asserted,
such causes of action.
2. "Consistency" of causes of action is required
under Section 258, as to joinder of causes of action;
yet "alternative" rights to recover, or liabilities, may
be joined under Sections 209 and 211, as to joinder of
Sa Supra Note 8, 241 N. Y. at 12.
Ibid. at p. 13.
*cIbid. at p. 21.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
parties. "Consistency" and "alternative" are intrinsi-
cally of identical meaning, but have two possible and
different meanings, in this branch of procedure. From
the point of view of joinder of causes of action, "con-
sistency" means "logical" consistency. From the point
of view of joinder of parties, "consistency" means
identity of the subject of inquiry, regarded function-
ally from the point of view of what evidence will be
adduced on the trial.
3. Section 209, as to joinder of parties plaintiff,
and Section 211, as to joinder of parties defendant,
have no necessary application, except where, in the
case of plaintiff, each owns a several and independent
cause of action, which he may, if he chooses, prosecute
alone,--or, in the case of defendants, each. has a sep-
arate and independent liability, for which he could be
sued alone,-and where, therefore, the parties plain-
tiff join, or parties defendant are joined-as the case
may be-not as necessary, but as proper parties, to
accomplish a joint trial of causes of action arising out
of the same facts in controversy, as hereinafter defined.
4. Sections 209 and 211 did not create the possi-
bility of actions being prosecuted together in favor of
or against parties jointly, or jointly and severally,
owning causes of action or liable by virtue thereof-
as the case may be. Such joinders were permissible
under the Code of Civil Procedure, and present no
problem of joinder of parties, but only of joinder of
causes of action, under Section 258.
5. The right to join parties plaintiff, who have
several causes of action-or parties defendant, who
are subject to several liability-if all of the causes of
action involved are embraced within one subdivision
of Section 258, other than Subdivision 9, is determined
solely by Sections 209 and 211, as the case may be,
without reference to Section 258. In such case, there
is no problem of joinder of causes of action, but only
of parties.
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6. The sole standard for joinder, under Sections
209 and 211, is the presence of a fundamental, sub-
stantial or decisive question of fact or law, which is
the identical subject of inquiry, and the determination
of which will vitally affect the right of all plaintiffs to
recover, or will similarly affect the liability of all de-
fendants,-though not the measure of recovery or lia-
bility, as the case may be. In the case of defendants,
it is not necessary that all should be interested in the
relief asked, or affected by every cause of action.
7. If, however, the causes of action asserted by
the plaintiffs are not embraced within one subdivision
of Section 258, other than Subdivision 9, but, on the
contrary, are sought to be joined under Subdivision 9
only, i.e., because it is alleged that said causes of ac-
tion arise out of the "same transaction" or are "tran-
sactions connected with the same subject of action," as
used in that subdivision, then the requirements of Sec-
tion 258 must be satisfied, namely: the causes of action
must arise out of the same transaction or be connected
with the same subject of action; they must be consis-
tent; they must not require different places of trial.
But none of these requirements (except where the
joinder is expressly made under Section 213) are
deemed satisfied, if the causes of action are inconsis-
tent. "Consistency," for this purpose, means logical
consistency, and not merely identity of the subject of
inquiry, which constitutes an investigation into the
same facts in controversy, as in the case of Sections
209 and 211, under Rule 6 (supra). Furthermore, by
the same standard, in this situation, i.e., where there
is logical inconsistency-there are no common ques-
tions of fact or law arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions, under Sections 209 and 211
(though, were not Subdivision 9 involved, there would
be). Accordingly, Section 258 is a limitation of Sec-
tion 209, in those cases where the joinder of causes of
action may be justified only by attempting to bring
them within Subdivision 9 of Section 258 (supra).
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8. Just as Section 258 is a limitation of Sections
209 and 211, so Section 213 (permitting defendants to
be joined, where plaintiff is in doubt) is, in turn, a
limitation of Section 258. Accordingly, notwithstand-
ing the requirement of Section 258, that causes of ac-
tion must be consistent, defendants may be joined as
against whom alternative liability is asserted, as long
as there be consistency in the functional sense, i.e., the
inquiry is as to the same facts in controversy from the
point of view of what evidence will be adduced on the
trial. Some of the decisions have reached this result
on the tlheory that the statute creates a new cause of
action: a state of doubt, which need not be broken up
into separate causes of action."
9. Where plaintiff's claim is in the alternative, it
would seem (though not conclusively) that joinder
will be permitted, if the causes are embraced with-
in one subdivision other than Subdivision 9 of Sec-
tion 258, on the basis of the functional definition of
"consistency." 10
10. Where there is no question as to the right to
join parties under Sections 209, 211, 213, because there
are no several rights or liabilities asserted, then the
sole standard for joinder of causes of action is Sec-
tion 258.
11. Ordinarily, it must, in such cases, appear
that the causes of action joined, belong to one sub-
division of Section 258, other than Subdivision 9,-
that they are consistent (in the logical sense), and do
not require different places of trial.
12. If the causes of action sought to be joined do
not belong to one subdivision, other than Subdivision
9 of Section 258, then it must appear that joinder is
justified under Subdivision 9, i.e, they must have
'Jamison v. Lamborn, 207 App. Div. 375, 202 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1st
Dept. 1923).
10 Roecklein v. American Sugar Refining Co., 222 App. Div. 540 (2nd
Dept. 1928). But cf. Olsen v. Bankers' Trust Co., 205 App. Div. 669, 199
N. Y. Supp. 700 (1st Dept. 1923).
THE CONSOLIDATED ACTION
arisen out of the same transaction or are transactions
connected with the same subject of action.
13. Inconsistency, where Sections 209 and 211
are not concerned, may be established in any of three
ways: (a) where the causes are such that the plaintiff
is put to an election of remedies; 11 (b) where there is
logical inconsistency, ix, where proof of one cause of
action would exclude any other theory of liability, as
distinguished from factual contradiction of allega-
tions of the several causes of action; 12 (c) where there
is procedural embarrassment in the mode of trial, the
rendition of the verdict, the form of the execution, or
by reason of statutory inhibition or public policy.13
14. "Same transaction" or "transactions con-
nected with the same subject of action" have different
signification in law and equity cases.
a. Ordinarily, at law, causes of action arise
out of the "same transaction" or are "transac-
tions connected with the same subject of action,"
if the right of action accrues by reason of the inci-
dence of the same producing cause or event which
is responsible for plaintiff's injury.1 4
b. In equity, causes of action arise out of
the "same transaction" or are "transactions con-
nected with the same subject of action" if they
involve an inquiry into the same facts in contro-
versy, from the point of view of the evidence
which will be adduced on the trial.15 The stand-
ard is that which has been imported even into law
actions, where joinder of parties plaintiff or de-
'
1Hill v. McKane, 71 Misc. 581, 128 N. Y. Supp. 819 (New York County
1911).
' Ader v. Blau, supra Note 8.
" Barkley v. Williams, 30 Misc. 607, 64 N. Y. Supp. 318 (Onondaga
County 1900) (treble damages); Reed v. Livermore, 101 App. Div. 254, 91
N. Y. Supp. 986 (3rd Dept. 1905) (body execution) ; but cf. France v. Berwind,
229 N. Y. 89, 127 N. E. 893 (1920); and observe Bowen v. True, 53 N. Y.
640 (1873).
"Ader v. Blau, supra Note 8.
Idem.
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fendant is authorized under Sections 209 and 211.
The standard is the same, i.e., whether there are
fundamental and substantial common questions
of fact or law. Consistency in these cases is re-
quired only in the functional sense as with respect
to parties, under Sections 209 and 211.
c. There are some cases at law where there
are no questions of parties involved, and where
the equitable standard prevails, i.e., cases in which
it is said that bound within the limits of the
"same transaction" are both a caus of action for
fraud inducing a contract, and a cause of action
for breach of the contract itself.16 These cases
illustrate the process of transition from legal to
equitable standards.
B.
Defendant's Interposition of Counterclaims.
On the subject of counterclaims, the Civil Practice Act
combined old and new as well. Sections 266 and 267 are not
substantially different from their prototypes in the Code of
Civil Procedure. But Section 271 was added to make it pos-
sible for a defendant to bring in additional parties, so as to
accomplish a more inclusive litigation,-carrying out the
same idea of one trial for one controversy.
The right to counterclaim was not broadened in any re-
spect, as to substance. As before, in actions at law, there is
the distinction between contract actions and all others. There
need be no relation between any contract counterclaimed and
any contract forming the basis of action. But, where the sub-
ject of a counterclaim is not a contract, then a counterclaim
can be interposed only under conditions which would permit
the joinder, under the requirements of Subdivision 9 of Sec-
tion 258, of the cause of action contained in the counterclaim
with the cause of action contained in the complaint, were
both owned and prosecuted by the plaintiff. "A cause of
action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in
the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim or
"France v. Berwind, supra Note 13.
THE CONSOLIDATED ACTION
connected with the subject of the action," as used in Section
266, is none other than one which arises out of the "same
transaction" or is one of the "transactions connected with
the same subject of action," as used in Subdivision 9 of Sec-
tion 258. So close and perfect is the analogy, that the same
double signification is given to the correlative phrases, just
as under Subdivision 9 of Section 258. Here, too, "same tran-
saction" or "transactions connected with the same subject of
action" require an identical producing cause or event in law
cases,'1 but only substantial identity of the subject of in-
quiry, in equity cases,18-and here, too, where fraud inducing
a contract is involved, there is the stage of transition where,
in law cases, equitable standards are applied.19
Section 271 made it possible for a defendant, where he
"sets up any counterclaim which raises questions between
himself and the plaintiff along with any other persons," to
bring in those persons, "who, if such counterclaim were to be
enforced by cross-action, would be defendants to such cross-
action."
Here, too, there has been and still is a difficult problem
of interpretation as to whether the logical or functional
standard should be adopted.
May the defendant bring in third persons who would be
liable to him alternatively with plaintiff, or only jointly, or
jointly and severally with plaintiff?
May a defendant bring in third persons, where, if de-
fendant were plaintiff, he might sue said third persons, to-
gether with plaintiff, on the theory that he is in doubt,
under Section 213?
Thus far, there have been intimations that defendant
cannot avail himself of the rights of a plaintiff under Section
213.20 It is said that such counterclaim would not "raise
questions between himself and the plaintiff along with any
other persons."
I Fulton Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hudson River Tel. Co., 200 N. Y. 287, 93
N. E. 1052 (1911) ; Rothschild v. Whitman, 132 N. Y. 472, 30 N. E. 858 (1892).
" Carpenter v. The Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 552 (1883); Kelly v.
Webster, 143 App. Div. 737, 128 N. Y. Supp. 58 (4th Dept. 1911).
'Gross v. Hochstim, 72 Misc. 343, 130 N. Y. Supp. 315 (App. Term 1911).
Williams v. Tompkins, 208 App. Div. 574, 204 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1st
Dept. 1924).
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This is merely a repetition of the controversy as to what
is meant by"'consistency." If we look for logical consistency,
the contention just stated would seem to be correct. Logical
consistency undoubtedly was the standard imposed by Sec-
tion 266, before it was incorporated in the Civil Practice Act.
But why not adopt the functional standard, that consistency
requires only identity of the subject of inquiry? Certainly,
that would comply with the requirements of Section 271,
which only provides that questions shall be raised between
said third persons along with plaintiff. Logical consistency
is not thereby required. Functional identity of inquiry would
seem to be enough. If there be identity of the subject of in-
quiry, with respect to a counterclaim properly interposed
under Section 266, what of it if the question presented in the
counterclaim be "who is liable," rather than "what is the
extent of the liability of each" ?
If we have in mind the modern standard, that there
should be one trial for one controversy, there would seem to
be no greater difficulty in construing Section 271 to be an
extension of or exception to Section 266, than there has been
in construing Section 213 to be an extension of or exception
to Section 258.
There is at least one authority which points that way.21
But there is no recognition of the problem.
C.
Adding or Dropping Parties After Action Commenced.
The general purpose of the statute, to facilitate the con-
solidated action, is evidenced from an examination of the
remaining statutes.
Section 192 authorizes the adding, dropping or substitu-
tion of parties at any stage of the proceeding. This section has
not, to date, been liberally construed,2 2 but indications are
that it will be, when its interpretation is presented to the
Court of Appeals.2 3 The contest as to whether there may be
-Gettinger v. Glasser, 204 App. Div. 829, 199 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1st Dept.
1923).
=Gray v. Vought & Co., 216 App. Div. 230, 214 N. Y. Supp. 765 (1st
Dept. 1926), but this case is clearly justified for other reasons.
' Cf. idenm 243 N. Y. 585, 154 N. E. 615 (1926), and Boyd v. U. S. Mtge.
& Trust Co., 187 N. Y. 262, 79 N. E. 999 (1907).
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complete substitution of parties is the old one, between the
logical and functional theories of a litigation. The substitu-
tion of all the parties on one side of a litigation, according to
strict logic, is the commencement of a new action, but func-
tionally is the continuation of the same controversy. But the
debate here seems entirely unjustified. The statute so plainly
permits substitution of parties, that there should be no room
for discussion. Of course, the right to substitute parties
is an important phase of the effort to dispose of as many
phases of one controversy as possible in one litigation.
Section 83 is a statute conceived in the same purpose.
The transfer of interest or devolution of liability pending an
action does not abate it. New parties may be substituted
or joined. Though this statute received but scant recognition
in the past, it has now come into its own. 23 a
Subdivision 2 of Section 193 is another section in the
same direction. It makes it possible for a defendant, within
the discretion of the court, to bring in a person who will be
liable to him by reason of the same facts in controversy. It
is not necessary to show joint, or joint and several liability
of the third person with defendant, to plaintiff. Being a new
statute the standard is the same as that applied in Sections
209 and 211, i.e., are there substantial common questions of
fact or law?
In this connection, Section 211-a is a recent addition of
importance. It permits an adjustment of the right to con-
tribution between joint tort feasors, who are both parties
defendant in the action. This was the procedural supplement
to the fundamental change in the substantive law,2 4 making
'a Philips v. West Rockaway Land Co., 203 App. Div. 202, 196 N. Y. Supp.
723 (2nd Dept. 1922). Observe the attempt to distinguish the elevated rail-
way cases.
21 The amendment to the Debtor and Creditor Law. in 1928. bv the addition
of Sections 230-240, brought tort feasors under the same classification as other
joint obligors, and brought joint tort obligations under the same rules as joint
contract obligations. This will appear from a reading of Section 231, which
is as follows:
"231. Definitions. In this article, unless otherwise expressly stated,
'obligation' includes a liability in tort; 'obligee' includes a person having
a right based on a tort. 'Several obligors' means obligors severally
bound for the same performance."
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it possible for a joint tort feasor to seek contribution. It
would seem that, accordingly, where one of several tort fea-
sors is not made a party defendant, the defendant on his
motion might have him brought in, to the intent that he
might, in that same action, be required to contribute his just
obligation. 24a No reason appears to the contrary. Such a re-
sult is within the spirit of the Civil Practice Act, which fos-
ters the idea of the consolidated action, notwithstanding a
recent Special Term decision to the contrary.25
Section 287 (interpleader by order) is the converse of
Subdivision 2 of Section 193. Whereas the latter permits a
defendant to bring in a third person who will be liable to
him, interpleader by order permits a defendant to substitute
or join a third person, who has a claim against defendant.
But here, too, the standard is whether there is substantially
the same subject of inquiry.
Subdivision 3 of Section 193 carries the same idea one
step further: It permits the third person to intervene as a
matter of right in the litigation of others, in order to inter-
pose his claim to the property involved. Here, too, there has
been difference of opinion as to how specific that interest
must be. Indications are that the third person must have an
interest in specific property; 26 yet there is considerable
'a Since contribution between joint tort feasors, prior to the amendment
(supra Note 24) was impossible, only by reason of the enforcement of an
arbitrary exception to the general equitable principle, it would seem to the
author that the purpose of the statute and its result was to assimilate the rules
of contribution, with respect to tort feasors, to those which have always
operated in equity, with respect to contractual obligors.
Thus viewed, Section 211-a of the Civil Practice Act is not an isolated
innovation, but supplementary to the change of the substantive law, represented
by Sections 230-240 of the Debtor and Creditor Law. It carries out the idea
of those changes in the substantive law, by making it possible, procedurally, to
adjust the rights of joint tort feasors, who are parties in the action. That was
always possible as to joint contractors, under Section 264 of the Civil Practice
Act. Where some of joint contractual obligors were not present in the action
Subdivision 2 of Section 193, as we shall show, permitted the defendant to
bring them in. Tort feasors could not then be brought in because there was no
contribution between them. The change in the substantive law by assimilating
tort feasors with other joint obligors makes the Subdivision 2 of Section 193
applicable to joint tort feasors, as well, where all of them are not before the
court, in the same manner as in the case of contractual obligors.
Rowe v. Denier, 238 N. Y. Supp. 9 (Erie County, Dec. 1929).
Cf. Wilcox v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 235 N. Y. 590, 139 N. E. 746 (1923)
in the light of the dissenting opinion of Judge Crane.
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authority that it is enough that he will be affected by the
outcome of the litigation"
This statute comes to us from the old Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and has carried with it, the interpretation of the de-
cisions adhering to the logical theory of a litigation.
Finally, there are the rules as to consolidation of actions.
The statute affords no affirmative standard. Yet, the implied
standard would seem to be clear: Are there substantial com-
mon questions of law or fact, which justify one trial for one
controversy, without unduly prejudicing any of the litigants?
Even here, however, there is debatable territory.
Conceded that the Court may consolidate actions pend-
ing between litigants who are parties to all of them,-may it
do so with respect to plaintiffs who appear only in some of
the actions and resist consolidation of these actions? 28
Much depends, in our answer to this question, on
whether we adopt the logical or functional theories of
litigation.
Surely the new provisions for consolidation of libel ac-
tions, on the application of defendants, is a most decisive
step toward the functional view of the trial.
Conclusion.
Thus, in outline, we have sketched the ideal of the con-
solidated action: one trial for one controversy.
There can be no question that what is new in the Civil
Practice Act tends inevitably towards the consolidated trial
of functionally related controversies. There can also be no
question that what was transferred from the Code of Civil
Procedure has hampered the full development of that result.
Nevertheless, we must remember that we are in the proc-
ess of transition. The purpose to accomplish one trial for one
controversy, which was never fully formulated, will even-
tually be accomplished. The stresses and strains of conflict-
ing forces, emanating from irreconcilable theories of the
proper scope of a single litigation, will finally reach a state
= See authorities cited in dissenting opinion of Judge Crane.
SCf. dictum in Brennan v. National Equitable Investment Co., 210 App.
Div. 426; 206 N. Y. Supp. 280 (1st Dept. 1924), and Crandall v. A. B. Leach
& Co., Inc., 222 App. Div. 292, 225 N. Y. Supp. 649 (4th Dept. 1927).
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of equipoise,-perhaps not as perfect nor with as high a
degree of utility, as if the structure had been built to plan
under the guidance of a single architect, but, nevertheless,
with the advantages which can come only from trial and
experience, and all the interest which attaches to historic
and monumental creations-which, through the vicissitudes
-of alterations and reconstructions, survive to capture our
admiration and command our respect.
But the procedural result will be that tested by func-
tional utility. So-called logical and rational standards will
gradually be submerged. The logic of procedural reform is
measured unerringly by the utility of the functional result.
Solution will be imminent when Section 258 is repealed.
JAY LEO ROTHSCHILD.
New York City.
APPENDIX
SEC. 209. JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS GENERALL.-AII persons
may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of tran-
sactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alter-
native where if such persons brought separate actions any common
question of law or fact would arise; provided that if upon the appli-
cation of any party it shall appear that such joinder may embarrass
or delay the trial of the action, the Court may order separate trials
or make such other order as may be expedient, and judgment may
be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be
entitled to relief, for the relief to which he or they may be entitled.
SEC. 211. JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS GENERALLY.-AII persons
may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and
judgment may be given against such one or more of the defendants
as may be found to be liable, according to their respective liabilities.
SEC. 212. DEFENDANT NEED NOT BE INTERESTED IN ALL THE
RELIEF CLAIMED.-It shall not be necessary that each defendant shall
be interested as to all the relief prayed for, or as to every cause of
action included in any proceeding against him; but the Court may
make such order as may appear just to prevent any defendant from
being embarrassed or put to expense by being required to attend any
proceedings in which he may have no interest.
SEC. 213. WHERE DOUBT EXISTS AS TO WHO IS LIABLE.-
Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is
entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants, to the intent
that the question as to which, if any, of the defendants is liable, and
to what extent, may be determined as between the parties.
SEC. 258. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF AcrIoN.-The plaintiff may
unite in the same complaint two or more causes of action, whether
they are such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable, or
both, where they are brought to recover as follows:
1. Upon contract, express or implied.
2. For personal injuries, except libel, slander, criminal
conversation or seduction.
3. For libel or slander.
4. For injuries to real property.
5. Real property in ejectment, with or without damages
for the withholding thereof.
6. For injuries to personal property.
7. Chattels, with or without damages for the taking or
detention thereof.
8. Upon claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract,
or by operation of law.
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9. Upon claims arising out of the same transaction, or
transactions connected with the same subject of action, whether
or not included within one or more of the other subdivisions
of this section.
10. For penalties incurred under the conservation law.
11. For penalties incurred- under the agricultural law.
12. For penalties incurred under the public health law.
It must appear upon the face of the complaint that all the causes of
action so united belong to one of the foregoing subdivisions of this
section; that they are consistent with each other; and it must appear
upon the face of the complaint, that they do not require different
places of trial.
A provision of statute authorizing a particular action, or regu-
lating the practice or procedure therein, shall not be construed to pre-
vent the plaintiff from uniting in the same complaint two or more
causes of action pursuant to this section.
SEC. 266. COUNTERCLAIM DEFINED.-A counterclaim, except as
otherwise provided by statute, must tend to diminish or defeat the
plaintiff's recovery, and must be one of the following causes of action
against the plaintiff, or, in a proper case, against the person whom
he represents, and in favor of the defendant, or of one or more de-
fendants, between whom and the plaintiff or the plaintiff and another
person or persons alleged to be liable a separate judgment may be
had in the action:
1. A cause of action arising out of the contract or tran-
saction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the
plaintiff's claim or connected with the subject of the action.
2. In an action on contract, any other cause of action
on contract existing at the commencement of the action.
SEC. 267. RULES RESPECTING THE ALLOWANCE 0F COUNTER-
cLAis.-The counterclaim specified in subdivision second of the last
section is subject to the following rules:
1. If the action is founded upon a contract which has
been assigned by the party thereto, other than a negotiable
promissory note or bill of exchange, a demand existing against
the party thereto or an assignee of the contract at the time of
the assignment thereof, and belonging to the defendant, in
good faith, before notice of the assignment, must be allowed
as a counterclaim to the amount of the plaintiff's demand, if it
might have been so allowed against the party, or the assignee,
while the contract belonged to him.
2. If the action is upon a negotiable promissory note or
bill of exchange which has been assigned to the plaintiff after
it became due, a demand existing against a person who as-
signed or transferred it after it became due must be allowed
as a counterclaim to the amount of the plaintiff's demand, if it
might have been so allowed against the assignor while the
note or bill belonged to him.
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3. If the plaintiff is a trustee for another or if the action
is in the name of a plaintiff who has no actual interest in the
contract upon which it is founded, a demand against the plain-
tiff shall not be allowed as a counterclaim; but so much of a
demand existing against the person whom he represents or
for whose benefit the action is brought, as will satisfy the
plaintiff's demand, must be allowed as a counterclaim, if it
might have been so allowed in an action brought by the person
beneficially interested.
SEC. 271. NEW PARTIES SET UP IN COUNTERCLAIM.-Where a
defendant sets up any counterclaim which raises questions between
himself and the plaintiff along with any other persons, he shall set
forth the names of all the persons who, if such counterclaim were to
be enforced by cross-action, would be defendants to such cross-action.
Where any such person is not a party to the action he shall be sum-
moned to appear by being served with a copy of the answer. A person
not a party to the action who is so served with an answer becomes a
defendant in the action as if he had been served with the summons.
Any such person named in an answer as a party to a counterclaim
may reply thereto within the time within which a defendant might
serve an answer to a complaint, or he may serve a notice of appear-
ance on the party interposing the counterclaim.
SEC. 192. NONJOINDER AND MISJOINDER.-No action or special
proceeding shall be defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of par-
ties. New parties may be added or substituted and parties misjoined
may be dropped by order of the Court at any stage of the cause as
the ends of justice may require.
SEC. 83. PROCEEDINGS UPON TRANSFER OF INTEREST, OR DEVO-
LUTION OF LIABILITY.-In case of a transfer of interest or devolu-
tion of liability the action may be continued by or against the original
party, unless the Court directs the person to whom the interest is
transferred or upon whom the liability is devolved to be substituted
in the action or joined with the original party as the case requires.
SEC. 193. DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS OF PARTIES BEFORE THE
CouRT.-1. The Court may determine the controversy as between
the parties before it where it can do so without prejudice to the rights
of others or by saving their rights; but where a complete determina-
tion of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of other
parties the Court must direct them to be brought in.
2. Where any party to an action shows that some third person,
not then a party to the action, is or will be liable to such party wholly
or in part for the claim made against such party in the action, the
Court on application of such party may order such person to be
brought in as a party to the action and direct that a supplemental
summons and a pleading alleging the claim of such party against such
person be served upon such person and that such person plead
thereto, so that the claim of such moving party against such person
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may be determined in such action, which shall thereupon proceed
against such person as a defendant therein to such judgment as may
be proper.
3. Where a person not a party to the action has an interest in
the subject thereof, or in real property the title to which may in any
manner be affected by the judgment, or in real property for injury
to which the complaint demands relief, and makes application to the
Court to be made a party, it must direct him to be brought in by the
proper amendment.
4. The controversy between the defendants shall not delay a
judgment to which the plaintiff is entitled, unless the Court otherwise
directs.
SEC. 211-A. ACTION BY ONE JOINT TORT-FEASOR AGAINST AN-
OTHER.-Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against
two or more defendants in an action for a personal injury or for
property damage, and such judgment has been paid in part or in full
by one or more of such defendants, each defendant who has paid
more than his own pro-rata share shall be entitled to contribution
from the other defendants with respect to the excess so paid over and
above the pro-rata share of the defendant or defendants making
such payment; provided, however, that no defendant shall be com-
pelled to pay to any other such defendant an amount greater than his
pro-rata share of the entire judgment. Such recovery may be had in
a separate action; or where the parties have appeared in the original
action, a judgment may be entered by one such defendant against
the other by motion on notice.
SEC. 287. INTERPLEADER IN PENDING ACTION.-A defendant
against whom an action to recover upon a contract or an action of
ejectment or an action to recover a chattel is pending at any time
before answer upon proof by affidavit that a person not a party to
the action makes a demand against him for the same debt or property
without collusion with him may apply to the Court upon notice to
that person and the adverse party for an order to substitute that
person in his place and to discharge him from liability to either, on
his paying into court the amount of the debt or delivering the posses-
sion of the property or its value to such person as the Court directs;
or, upon it appearing that the defendant disputes in whole or in part
the liability as asserted against him by different claimants or that he
has some interest in the subject-matter of the controversy which he
desires to assert, his application may be for an order joining the other
claimant or claimants as co-defendants with him in the action. The
Court, in its discretion, may make such order upon such terms as to
costs and payments into court of the amount of the debt or part
thereof or delivery of the possession on the property or its value or
part thereof as may be just, and thereupon the entire controversy may
be determined in the action.
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SEC. 96. CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE OF ACTIONS.-An
action may be severed and actions may be consolidated whenever it
can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.
SEC. 97. CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS PENDING IN DIFFERENT
CouRTs.-Where one of the actions is pending in the Supreme Court
and another is pending in another court, the Supreme Court, by
order, may remove to itself the action in the other court and consoli-
date it with that in the Supreme Court.
SEC. 97-A. CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS FOR LIBEL.-It shall be
competent for the Court upon an application by or on behalf of two
or more defendants in actions instituted by the same plaintiff for or
on account of respective libels of similar purport or effect, to make
an order for the consolidation of such actions, so that they shall be
tried together; and after such order has been made, and before the
trial of the said actions, the defendant in any new action instituted
by the same plaintiff for or on account of a libel of a similar purport
or effect shall also be entitled to be joined in such consolidated action
upon a joint application being made by such new defendant and the
defendants in the actions already consolidated. In a consolidated action
under this section the jury shall assess the whole amount of the dam-
ages (if any) in one sum, but a separate verdict shall be taken for or
against each defendant in the same way as if the actions consolidated
had been tried separately; and if the jury shall have found a verdict
against a defendant or defendants in the consolidated action, -they
shall proceed to apportion the amount of damages which they shall
have so found between and against such defendants and shall render
the verdicts accordingly.
SEC. 338-A. EVIDENCE IN ACTION FOR LIBEL.-At the trial of
any civil action for libel, the defendant may prove, for consideration
by the jury in fixing the amount of the verdict, that the plaintiff has
already recovered damages, or has received, or agreed to receive,
compensation in respect of a libel or libels of a similar purport or
effect as the libel for which such action has been brought.
